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13 The Politics of Stabilization 
and Structural Adjustment 
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman 
13.1 Introduction 
A major theme of the country studies in this volume is the relationship 
between policy choice and economic performance. What policies con- 
tributed to debt crises in the first place and what corrective measures 
have been most successful in managing them? This chapter, by contrast, 
examines the way political processes, both international and domestic, 
influence developing country stabilization and adjustment efforts. Of 
course, economic circumstance defines the policy agenda and is a pow- 
erful constraint on the range of policy options. But states that are 
similarly situated in economic terms have adopted different adjustment 
strategies and external bargaining positions because of domestic polit- 
ical constraints. Programs that succeed in one context are therefore 
difficult to implement in others. We review a range of different hy- 
potheses about the politics of adjustment and build some contingent 
generalizations around the country cases included in this volume. While 
we cannot provide ironclad political laws, such analysis is important 
both in understanding the past and in generating realistic and sustain- 
able programs in the future. 
13.2 The International Politics of the Debt Crisis 
One of the most notable features of the crisis period that began in 
August 1982 with the emergency rescheduling of the Mexican debt has 
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been the politicization of international credit issues. Although the Rea- 
gan administration initially hoped to maintain a distance from the ne- 
gotiations between debtors, banks, and the I M F  that have characterized 
the postcrisis period, concerns about the stability of the international 
financial system impelled treasury and central bank officials from the 
creditor countries to become actively involved in the process. In the 
case of certain strategically important countries, such as Mexico, Tur- 
key, and Egypt, traditional foreign policy concerns also came into play. 
Notwithstanding calls for more comprehensive solutions, resched- 
uling remains the central mechanism for managing the debt crisis, which 
suggests that international credit flows to developing countries must 
be analyzed in a bargaining framework. Despite some marginal inno- 
vations, three features of the international bargaining structure have 
remained more or less constant. First has been the assumption-or the 
fiction-that all obligations are to be met in full. Until recently, relief 
had not been on the agenda, despite the development of a secondary 
market in which developing country debt traded at fairly deep dis- 
counts. Second, was the assumption that the burden of policy changes 
should fall primarily on the debtors rather than the creditors. Devel- 
oping countries have failed in their political efforts to link the debt 
issue with developed country fiscal and trade policies, interest-rate 
management, or the reform of international commodity trade, and have 
had very uneven success in securing additional concessional aid flows. 
Finally, all negotiations have been handled on a case-by-case basis. 
Each debtor is expected to confront its creditors alone, rather than in 
collaboration with other debtor countries facing similar problems. 
Whatever practical arguments may be advanced in favor of this system 
over a more comprehensive one-and there are many (Cooper 1986)- 
it is clearly a bargaining structure that tends eo ips0 to favor the creditors. 
There are three resources that developing countries can bring to bear 
in these negotiations: size, political-strategic significance, and the avail- 
ability of nonconditional resources. 
13.2.1 Size 
Evidence from recent rescheduling exercises suggests that larger 
debtors do better than smaller ones in the rates, maturities, and grace 
periods they receive (see table 13.1). They have also been more suc- 
cessful in securing additional forms of relief, including the concerted 
lending agreements (Sachs and Huizinga 1987). Larger debtors have 
also pioneered more unorthodox rescheduling agreements and adjust- 
ment packages. Mexico was the first country to negotiate a multi-year 
rescheduling agreement (MYRA), and Argentina was able to win IMF 
acceptance of the unorthodox price freeze and currency plan known 
as the Plan Austral. 
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Table 13.1 Average Terms of Bank Debt Reschedulings, By Group of 
Countries (1978-June 1985) 
Interest Rates 
Grace Period Maturity (spread over LIBOR) 
Large Debtors 3.25 years 11.3 1 years 1.41% 
(> $25 billion, 
Jan. 1 ,  1985) 
Medium-sized 4.36 years 8.28 years 1.69% 
Debtors ($10 to 
$25 billion) 
Small Debtors 2.61 years 7.26 years 1.82% 
( 4 1 0  billion) 
(Note: Average terms for rescheduling of medium- and long-term bank debt, both public 
and private. Excludes restructuring of short-term debt, arrears and terms of trade fa- 
cilities. Debtors are classified on basis of total external liabilities of banks and non-banks 
to banks end-December 1985. “Large” debtors are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Ven- 
ezuela; “medium-sized” debtors reaching rescheduling agreements during the period are 
Chile, Philippines, Yugoslavia and Poland. Source: Watson, et. al. 1986. 
An exception to this rule concerns the likelihood of repudiation. Until 
Brazil’s suspension of payments in February 1987, large countries had 
been content to exercise the tacit threat of repudiation; the smaller and 
weaker countries-Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, Zaire and Zambia-actually ex- 
ercised the option. Small debtors may be more tempted to “free ride,” 
particularly in a setting where increasing numbers of other countries 
are doing so. The reason for small country repudiation may also have 
to do with bank strategy and reputational concerns. Banks may prefer 
to allow small states to repudiate rather than to concede to the financing 
required to keep loans performing. 
13.2.2 Strategic Significance 
Size is not the only variable of significance in determining bargaining 
outcomes, however. A number of smaller states, including Zaire, have 
manipulated their strategic position or concern about domestic political 
instability to gain additional assistance. Turkey probably provides the 
clearest example of how geo-strategic concerns influence official as- 
sistance. Of $9.8 billion of debt that Turkey restructured between 1978 
and 1987, $5.5 billion was negotiated through a consortium of OECD 
governments. The OECD did link its 1979 offer of concessional finance 
to acceptance of an IMF program, but the amount of additional assis- 
tance totalled $3 billion over the next three years despite the fact that 
the 1979 program was not particularly successful. The OECD com- 
mitments were followed by unusual levels of assistance from the World 
Bank and IMF, including five consecutive structural adjustment loans 
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and a three-year standby agreement in 1980 that brought Turkey’s total 
IMF commitments to 870 percent of quota, the largest multiple awarded 
to any country up until that time. 
More generally, central banks of the Group of Five have played an 
important role in managing particular crises through the organization 
of rescue packages and the provision of bridging loans. Informal con- 
ventions have divided these international lender of last resort respon- 
sibilities along lines of regional and political influence. Germany played 
a leading role in Turkey and Poland; the United States in Mexico; 
France in Francophone Africa (Wellons 1987, chap. 7). This decen- 
tralized pattern of leadership includes the provision and orchestration 
of concessional assistance, which, as is well known, also follows lines 
of political interest. 
13.2.3 Nonconditional Resources 
A final factor influencing debt negotiations, particularly with the IMF, 
is the availability of nonconditional resources. These resources natu- 
rally shift bargaining power toward the debtors and make them less 
likely to accept Fund conditionality. This tendency is particularly clear 
among the capital-importing oil exporters, including Venezuela, Ni- 
geria, Mexico, Ecuador, and Indonesia prior to the Pertamina crisis. 
The stylized facts are as follows. Commodity booms make governments 
more dependent on commodity-based revenue because of the relative 
ease politically of taxing commodity exports as opposed to income. 
The income from commodity exports also provides the basis for ad- 
ditional foreign borrowing. This double windfall has three political con- 
sequences. First, it reduces the political incentives to undertake any 
adjustments that have distributional consequences. Second, it increases 
the range of political claims on state-controlled resources, not only 
from rent- and revenue-seeking groups in society, but from spending 
constituencies within the government itself. Finally, the windfalls pro- 
vide governments with resources that can be used for political ends, 
whether through corruption and the “financing” of elections, pork- 
barrel expenditures on particular projects that cement geographical 
bases of support, o r  the expansion of subsidies and entitlements. 
It is thus common to see increased government revenues from com- 
modity booms mark the beginning of a cycle of increased borrowing, 
widening fiscal deficits and, ultimately, a return of balance of payments 
crises. Mexico provides an example. In 1978 when the country began 
to experience a boom as the result of increased oil revenues, it repaid 
its obligations to the IMF and abandoned the terms of a standby reached 
in 1976. A new cycle of borrowing began, purportedly to finance in- 
vestment in the oil sector itself. By early 1982, voices within the gov- 
ernment and the international financial community were urging caution. 
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Yet there was a political decision not to stop the country’s growth prior 
to elections. Central to the fiscal problems the country faced was a 
rapid expansion of subsidies to food and domestic energy consumption 
designed to cement the ruling party’s support among the urban working 
and middle classes. 
13.2.4 Cooperation among Debtors 
In addition to the possibility of operating within the prevailing case-by- 
case bargaining structure, debtors may conceivably seek to alter the rules 
of the game through cooperative behavior. Up until now, the barriers to 
collective action among debtors have been greater than those facing the 
relatively small group of money-center banks. Banks have thus been able 
to discourage a debtor cartel by isolating and punishing recalcitrant debt- 
ors, while rewarding others, such as Mexico, for good behavior. The 
debtors with real power have therefore preferred the advantages of strik- 
ing their own separate deals to the risks of cartel leadership. 
The barriers to collective action among debtors should not be over- 
estimated though. LDC debt is also heavily concentrated on the bor- 
rower side. Given this concentration, the defection of one large debtor 
would be enough to change the system substantially, even with the 
assumption of free riding. There can be little doubt that the negotiations 
surrounding Brazil’s February 1987 suspension of interest payments 
will have a profound effect on future reschedulings. Learning among 
debtor governments increases the possibility that concessions granted 
in one case will become the basis for demands by other countries even 
in the absence of overt collaboration. 
13.3 The Domestic Politics of Stabilization and Adjustment 
The international and domestic politics of stabilization and adjust- 
ment are closely linked. Since no debtor government can deflect all of 
the costs of adjustment, each must also bargain with domestic actors 
over how to allocate burdens on the home front. The central political 
dilemma is that stabilization and adjustment policies, no matter how 
beneficial they may be for the country as a whole, entail the imposition 
of short-term costs and have distributional implications. Two questions 
are of importance: Why do governments choose the policy packages 
they do-the question of program design-and what are the political 
conditions under which they will be sustained, the problem of imple- 
mentation. We focus on the influence of three clusters of variables: the 
power of different interest groups; the nature of central government 
institutions, including the bureaucracy; and the influence of short-term 
political calculations, including those associated both with elections 
and with other, less institutionalized, political transitions. 
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13.3.1 Interest Groups: Business, Labor, and the Urban-Rural 
Balance 
Business-Government Relations 
The central problem confronting any government in its relations with 
the private sector is in establishing a credible and predictable policy 
environment. Confidence in government policy is a major factor in 
determining time horizons and willingness to take risk, and thus affects 
levels of investment and capital flight. Other things being equal, leftist 
governments and political systems with a history of populist attacks 
on business and property rights will face greater difficulties establishing 
the credibility of policy, regardless of their stated intentions. Perhaps 
the sharpest contrast among the countries included in this project is 
between Argentina and Korea. Argentine politics in the postwar period 
has been deeply polarized between populist and antipopulist forces. A 
close relationship exists between political cycles and the broad swings 
in the country’s macroeconomy. The Korean political system under 
Park Chung Hee (1964-79), by contrast, while not without periods of 
unrest, was based on a firm business-government alliance. Populist and 
leftist forces were excluded, if not repressed. Policy was coherent and 
credible, contributing to a high level of investor confidence. 
It is important to note, however, that segments of business may have 
reason to oppose orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment mea- 
sures; much depends on their sectoral position and international finance 
and trade links. Firms with strong international financial ties and export- 
oriented industries are more likely to support orthodoxy. Even where 
they are not politically organized, liquid asset holders constitute a 
constraint on governments of both the left and right through the threat 
of capital flight (Frieden forthcoming). Those without dependence on 
international financial markets, by contrast, will have less reason to 
back a conciliatory policy toward international creditors, and may pos- 
itively oppose credit restraint and the removal of various sectoral sup- 
ports. While export-oriented firms will support more liberal trade and 
exchange rate policies, firms in import-substituting sectors that have 
been heavily subsidized and protected will present an obstacle to market- 
oriented reforms, including import liberalization. The longer such pol- 
icies have been in place, the more politically difficult it is to make the 
transition to outward-oriented policies. These types of cleavages among 
different segments of business are particularly visible in the large, Latin 
American countries, including Brazil and Mexico. 
The Political Role of Labor 
The urban informal sector has operated as a constraint on govern- 
ment policy in a number of countries. The lifting of food subsidies, in 
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particular, has frequently resulted in spontaneous rioting (Bienen and 
Gersovitz 1985). In general, however, the organized workers of the 
modern sector, both public and private, are best positioned to act 
politically against stabilization and devaluation, with their anticipated 
consequences for employment and real wages. Other things being equal, 
one would expect the degree of unionization and the likelihood of 
adopting and sustaining orthodox stabilization and structural adjust- 
ment measures to be inversely correlated. Those governments relying 
heavily on labor support are more likely to tolerate inflation, experiment 
with heterodox programs, and adopt tough bargaining postures with 
external creditors. 
This expectation is not necessarily borne out, however. As with the 
private sector, the political behavior of labor depends on sectoral po- 
sition. Equally important, however, is the institutional context within 
which labor operates. Where strategic labor sectors are weak and pen- 
etrated, the burdens of stabilization policies are easy to impose, al- 
though the economic program, and the government itself, may encounter 
long-term costs in the form of decreased legitimacy. Weak or controlled 
labor movements in the Philippines and Korea granted the government 
greater leeway in imposing the costs of stabilization, at least initially. 
Labor control was also a central feature of the stabilization programs 
of the “bureaucratic authoritarian” governments of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Uruguay over the 1960s and 1970s. 
Literature on the advanced industrial states suggests that where labor 
is organized in peak associations with a secure place in the political 
process, it may be easier to induce them to trade short-term wage 
restraint for longer-term gains. This holds true even under leftist gov- 
ernments (Goldthorpe 1984). None of the developing countries have 
developed the kind of corporatist arrangements linking business, gov- 
ernment, and labor that are found in the small European democracies. 
Nonetheless, Venezuela and Mexico suggest that the integration of 
labor into multiclass parties may affect the government’s ability to 
negotiate compensatory agreements that ease the adjustment process. 
The greatest difficulty comes in intermediate cases where labor is 
capable of defensive mobilization, but uncertain about its longer-term 
place in the political system. This situation is typical of a number of 
developing countries making the transition to democracy, including 
Brazil, where labor movements have previously been under strong 
government control. 
The Role of the Rural Sector 
For some policy reforms, including devaluation and food pricing 
policy, the balance of power between rural and urban interests may be 
the most salient cleavage. In general, countries in which political elites 
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are forced to be attentive to the countryside should pursue policies 
favorable to agricultural and rural interests, including realistic exchange 
rate policies (Sachs 1985). This, in turn, is likely to occur where political 
parties have rural roots or where the peasantry is available for revo- 
lutionary mobilization. Indonesian macroeconomic policy following the 
rural uprisings of the mid-1960s provides a particularly clear example. 
Several caveats are in order, however. First, predictions are difficult 
to make on the basis of simple proxies of the urban-rural balance alone. 
A large unorganized rural sector can easily be offset by concentrated 
urban interests, as is the case in a number of African countries. Second, 
it is not clear that the turn to outward-oriented growth in the East Asian 
NICs can be linked to a concern with rural interests. Fears of insur- 
gency and rural unrest were behind the land reforms in Korea and 
Taiwan in the fifties, but the turn to export-led growth is more clearly 
traced to a decline in aid flows and the structural problems associated 
with import-substitution. It can be argued, however, that these struc- 
tural problems were partly a function of the absence of natural resource 
exports that could finance continued import-substitution. In Latin 
America, by contrast, the availability of such resources allowed import- 
substitution to continue for longer than it might have otherwise. 
13.3.2 The Role of Political Institutions 
As the foregoing discussion should make clear, policy choice is not 
only a function of the distribution of interests, but of the institutional 
context in which they operate. The major debate on stabilization among 
political scientists concerns whether authoritarian or elected govern- 
ments are more “successful” at stabilization (Haggard 1986; Kaufman 
1985; Remmer 1986; Ames 1987, chap. 5). Cross-national studies do 
not yield conclusive results, but this probably has to do with the crude- 
ness of the authoritarian-democratic dichotomy. A distinction must be 
made between “strong” and “weak” authoritarian governments. 
“Strong” authoritarian governments possess a number of organiza- 
tional resources that make them more successful in imposing the costs 
of stabilization, at  least in the short run. These include a relatively 
insulated decision-making process, weak legislatures, and corporatist 
organization, or control, of interests. Korea’s ability to adjust swiftly 
during the early 1980s, for example, can be traced in part to a tightly 
controlled budgetary process and controls on labor. 
Many “authoritarian” governments, however, are in fact quite weak, 
characterized by extensive patron-client networks, a low degree of 
insulation from the political demands of society, extensive interference 
in even routine economic decision making by political elites and a high 
degree of instability. At the extreme, some “authoritarian” regimes 
are little more than personal autocracies in which the lines between 
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public and private finances are blurred. The succession of Bolivian 
military juntas in the late 1970s and early 1980s is representative of a 
system in which central political institutions are extremely weak. Such 
systems are likely to have more difficulties than “strong” authoritarian 
regimes in imposing costs, and will probably fare worse than many 
democracies. 
This is particularly true where democracies have evolved stable pat- 
terns of interest group representation and consultation; just like “au- 
thoritarian” governments, democracies constitute a heterogenous 
category. A distinction is possible between those plebiscitary demo- 
cratic systems, such as Peru, that rest on broad, mass appeals and 
those with more institutionalized systems of representation, usually 
involving stronger party systems, such as Colombia. Such institutional 
mechanisms aggregate broader interests, and can thus act as a check 
both on the disruptive impact of plebiscitary appeals as well as on 
particularistic rent seeking. 
Analysis of institutional capacity must be extended to the bureau- 
cracy itself. The attention given to policy reform among economists 
has not, in general, been matched by adequate attention to the admin- 
istrative requirements of successful policy implementation. Quite ob- 
viously, the administrative capacity of government is a crucial 
determinant of the success of a number of policy measures, particularly 
those structural adjustment measures demanding government support. 
The transition to export-led growth in Korea, for example, involved 
not only reforms in the broad system of incentives, but a complex 
system of organizational supports to exporters, including the provision 
of market information and technical assistance, a complex drawback 
system, and subsidized credit. All of these policies rested on an efficient 
bureaucracy (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1987). 
The characteristics of the bureaucracy likely to affect its performance 
include patterns of recruitment, particularly the extent to which they 
are meritocratic or not, and the degree of coordination among different 
ministries and between ministries and state-owned enterprises. This 
last issue is particularly salient for the analysis of the debt crisis. In 
all of the cases included in this project, state-owned enterprises were 
crucial in the expansion of foreign debt. Obligations were frequently 
incurred without central government or  ministerial approval, and even 
without the monitoring that would give central bank and finance min- 
istry officials an adequate picture of debt aggregates. 
While it should be clear that bureaucratic capabilities matter, several 
amendments are required. First, the ability of bureaucracies to act, 
even highly competent ones, is dependent on the larger political con- 
text. In Mexico over the last two decades, for example, the influence 
of the treasury and central bank has changed directly with the broader 
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political strategy of successive administrations. Second, bureaucracies 
can easily become overdeveloped or wedded to organizational routines 
that impede, rather than facilitate adjustment. While central govern- 
ment guidance was important in earlier phases of export-led growth in 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, dirigiste traditions may now present 
barriers to more rapid growth. The dogmatic course pursued by en- 
trenched laissez-faire technocrats in Argentina and Chile in the late 
1970s provides another example of bureaucratic rigidity. 
The bureaucracy must also be viewed not only as an administrative 
structure, but as an interest group in its own right. Civil servants are 
politically significant actors in a number of countries, particularly small, 
low-income states where they play an important role in urban coali- 
tions. Establishing control over the expansion of the government itself 
is one of the most difficult tasks associated with stabilization and ad- 
justment. Brazil’s difficulties in reining in its sprawling state-owned 
enterprise sector provides an example. 
13.3.3 Political Cycles and Transitions 
The broad analysis of interest groups and institutions is useful in 
drawing some cross-national comparisons, but we also want to know 
what political forces influence policy changes over time within partic- 
ular countries. This demands closer attention to the short-term survival 
strategies of politicians (Ames 1987). One important hypothesis centers 
on electoral cycles. Incumbant governments will manipulate macro- 
economic policy to maximize their short-term electoral chances, tol- 
erating higher levels of inflation in order to achieve lower levels of 
unemployment, for example. Adjustment programs are more likely to 
be abandoned prior to elections, while post-election periods, particu- 
larly where incumbants have been returned, are more conducive to 
stabilization. 
The evidence for the business cycle claim is weak in the advanced 
industrial states and its analytic underpinnings have also been chal- 
lenged. Brian Barry (1985, 300) notes, for example, that it assumes 
“a collection of rogues competing for the favors of a larger collection 
of dupes.” Some of the factors mitigating the electoral cycle in the 
advanced industrial states are likely to be absent in the developing 
countries, however. Policy-making institutions are weaker and less 
insulated and publics less informed. Lower levels of income and ex- 
tensive poverty are likely to make instrumental appeals more pow- 
erful. The one, thorough cross-national study done on the cycle for a 
group of developing countries finds strong evidence for politically 
motivated fiscal policy (Ames 1987). Individual country studies in- 
cluded in this project, such as those for Mexico (chap. 7 in this volume) 
and the Philippines (chap. 8), also suggest the existence of political 
cycles of spending. 
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The political cycle model must be extended to cover noninstitution- 
alized transitions between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Given 
the uncertainty surrounding such transitions, new democratic govern- 
ments are likely to pursue expansionist policies early in office, a pattern 
exactly the opposite of that predicted for institutionalized democracies. 
The expansionist phases of the Cruzado and Austral plans in Brazil 
and Argentina reflect this pattern. New authoritarian regimes, by con- 
trast, frequently come to power amidst political-economic crises pre- 
cisely to impose “discipline.” This was true, though under differing 
circumstances, in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966 and 1976), Turkey 
(1971 and 1980), Indonesia (1966), Bolivia (1971), and Korea (1980). 
Authoritarian governments will pursue more politically motivated pol- 
icies only as they face opposition and attempt to make the transition 
to constitutional rule (Ames 1987, chap. 5) .  
13.4 Conclusions 
Drawing conclusions for policy from political analysis may, at first, 
seem difficult, since a number of variables that are relevant are not 
manipulable. In fact, there is probably more room for political maneu- 
ver and persuasion than is frequently recognized. The reform process 
is not merely a technical, policy-making exercise, but demands the 
building of political coalitions of support. This can be facilitated by 
campaigns of information targeted at groups that stand to gain. Im- 
posing costs is, of course, more difficult, but groups will be more likely 
to acquiesce to short-term costs if they are consulted and sense that 
their position in the political system is secure. In a number of policy 
areas, compensation to potential losers may be less costly than an effort 
to force through policies that are likely to fail politically. The timing 
of the introduction of reform measures is also at least partly manipu- 
lable, and can affect the likelihood of program success. In some cases, 
it may be wiser simply not to initiate a program at all, rather than to 
introduce measures that are doomed to failure. Political analysis also 
suggests the importance of a range of longer-term reforms that affect 
the capacity of governments over time. These include administrative 
reform and training, which have been given inadequate weight in Fund 
programs to date. In the end, however, there is no substitute for a 
nuanced understanding of the political and social setting into which 
economic programs are introduced. 
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